

Richard E. Purdy
03/28/99 03:21 PM

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Subject: Rich Purdy's resignation




In case email scrambles the format of the memo, it is attached as a word 97 document: Rich Purdy's Resignation.doc

I resign my position as Environmental Specialist effective 6 April 1999. My resignation is prompted by my profound disappointment in 3M's handling of the environmental risks associated with the manufacture and use of perfluorinated sulfonates (PFOS) (CAS# 29081-56-9) and its precursors, such as ethyl FOSE alcohol (CAS #1691-99-2) and methyl FOSE alcohol (CAS #24448-09-7).

Perfluorooctanesulfonate is the most insidious pollutant since PCB. It is probably more damaging than PCB because it does not degrade, whereas PCB does; it is more toxic to wildlife; and its sink in the environment appears to be biota and not soil and sediment, as is the case with PCB.

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I have worked within the system to learn more about these chemicals and to make the company aware of the dangers associated with its continued use. But I have continually met roadblocks, delays, and indecision. For weeks on end I have received assurances that my samples would be analyzed soon--never to see results. There are always excuses and little is accomplished. I can illustrate with several examples.

- For more than twenty years 3M's ecotoxicologists have urged the company to allow testing to perform an ecological risk assessment on PFOS and similar chemicals. Since I have been assigned to the problem a year ago, the company has continued its hesitancy.

- Over a period of seven months I made frequent requests that ecological risk consultants be hired to help me plan toxicity testing, environmental sampling, chemical fate studies, and ecological risk procedure. I still have not received authorization even to bring people in to interview.

- I requested, very frequently, over a nine-month period, a sample of chemical to send out for fate property and ecotoxicity testing. Finally I was provided with one that apparently the division had had all along.

- I put together a pioneer risk assessment on PFOS that indicated a greater than 100% probability of harm to sea mammals, based on preliminary data on the concentration of PFOS in menhaden fish meal. The 8e committee told me that they would like to reconsider the assessment after we had a validated value for fishmeal. That analysis was given high priority by the committee. After three months the analysis is still not done--not because there were technical problems, but because management did not actually give the analysis high priority.

- 3M submitted a TSCA 8e last May. There is tremendous concern within EPA, the country, and the world about persistent bioaccumulative chemicals such as PFOS. Just before that submission we found PFOS in the blood of eaglets--eaglets still young enough that their only food consisted of fish caught in remote lakes by their parents. This finding indicates a widespread environmental contamination and food chain transfer and probable bioaccumulation and bio-magnification. This is a very significant finding that the 8e reporting rule was created to collect. 3M chose to report simply that PFOS had been found in the blood of animals, which is true

but omits the most significant information.

“ One of our customers, Griffin, has data on some of our chemicals. They developed this data for pesticide registration purposes. I started regularly asking for permission to visit Griffin and view the data last May. Their data can help us plan our studies of similar chemicals. It can also indicate if there is an unforeseen risk to certain biota or via certain exposure pathways. It was ten months before I was allowed to visit Griffin, at which time I did not get to see the data. I have to return another time to see it.

· 3M waited too long to tell customers about the widespread dispersal of PFOS in people and the environment. We knew before May of 1998, yet 3M did not start telling customers until January of 1999. I felt guilty about this and told customers I personally knew earlier. Still, it was not as early as it should have been. I kept waiting for 3M to do its duty, as I was continually assured that it would. Some of the customers have done risk assessments on the PFOS precursor they use. They assume there is not a background in the environment and in wildlife. Since there is a background, their risk assessments are inaccurate. Thus they can make inappropriate business decisions and not realize that their use of PFOS precursors contributes to an aggregate risk.

· 3M continues to make and sell these chemicals, though the company knows of an ecological risk assessment I did that indicates there is a better than 100% probability that perfluorooctansulfonate is biomagnifying in the food chain and harming sea mammals. This chemical is more stable than many rocks. And the chemicals the company is considering for replacement are just as stable and biologically available. The risk assessment I performed was simple, and not worst case. If worst case is used, the probability of harm exceeds 100,000%.

· 3M told those of us working on the fluorochemical project not to write down our thoughts or have email discussions on issues because of how our speculations could be viewed in a legal discovery process. This has stymied intellectual development on the issue, and stifled discussion on the serious ethical implications of decisions.

I have worked to the best of my ability within the system to see that the right actions are taken on behalf of the environment. At almost every step, I have been assured that action will be taken-yet I see slow or no results. I am told the company is concerned, but their actions speak to different concerns than mine. I can no longer participate in the

process that 3M has established for the management of PFOS and precursors. For me it is unethical to be concerned with markets, legal defensibility and image over environmental safety.

Sincerely,

Rich Purdy

28 March 1999

To: 3M

I resign my position as Environmental Specialist effective 6 April 1999. My resignation is prompted by my profound disappointment in 3M's handling of the environmental risks associated with the manufacture and use of perfluorinated sulfonates (PFOS)(CAS# 29081-56-9) and its precursors, such as ethyl FOSE alcohol (CAS #1691-99-2) and methyl FOSE alcohol (CAS #24448-09-7).

Perfluorooctanesulfonate is the most insidious pollutant since PCB. It is probably more damaging than PCB because it does not degrade, whereas PCB does; it is more toxic to wildlife; and its sink in the environment appears to be biota and not soil and sediment, as is the case with PCB.

I have worked within the system to learn more about this chemical and to make the company aware of the dangers associated with its continued use. But I have continually met roadblocks, delays, and indecision. For weeks on end I have received assurances that my samples would be analyzed soon--never to see results. There are always excuses and little is accomplished. I can illustrate with several examples.

- For more than twenty years 3M's ecotoxicologists have urged the company to allow testing to perform an ecological risk assessment on PFOS and similar chemicals. Since I have been assigned to the problem a year ago, the company has continued its hesitancy.
- Over a period of seven months I made frequent requests that ecological risk consultants be hired to help me plan toxicity testing, environmental sampling, chemical fate studies, and ecological risk procedure. I still have not received authorization even to bring people in to interview.
- I requested, very frequently, over a nine-month period, a sample of chemical to send out for fate property and ecotoxicity testing. Finally I was provided with one that apparently the division had had all along.
- I put together a pioneer risk assessment on PFOS that indicated a greater than 100% probability of harm to sea mammals, based on preliminary data on the concentration of PFOS in menhaden fish meal. The 8e committee told me that they would like to reconsider the assessment after we had a validated value for fishmeal. That analysis was given high priority by the committee. After three months the analysis is still not done--not because there were technical problems, but because management did not actually give the analysis high priority.
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- ◆ One of our customers, Griffin, has data on some of our chemicals. They developed this data for pesticide registration purposes. I started regularly asking for permission to visit Griffin and view the data last May. Their data can help us plan our studies of similar chemicals. It can also indicate if there is an unforeseen risk to certain biota or via certain exposure pathways. It was ten months before I was allowed to visit Griffin, at which time I did not get to see the data. I have to return another time to see it.
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Sincerely,

Rich Purdy

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